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I. Introduction
Consider a group of agents who must be served in a facility. The 
facility can handle only one agent at a time and agents incur waiting 
costs. The queueing problem is concerned with finding the order to 
serve agents and the (positive or negative) monetary compensations 
they should receive. We assume that an agent’s waiting cost per unit 
of time is constant, but that agents differ in their waiting costs. 
Each agent’s utility is equal to his monetary transfer minus his total 
waiting cost. This problem has been analyzed extensively from the 
incentive perspective (Dolan 1978; Suijs 1996; Mitra 2001, 2002; 
and others). 
Maniquet (2003) proposes to solve the queueing problem by 
applying what is probably the best-known solution for cooperative 
games, the Shapley value (Shapley 1953). To do this, he defines the 
worth of a coalition to be the minimum total waiting cost incurred 
by its members under the optimistic assumption that they are served 
before the non-coalitional members. The resulting rule, the minimal 
transfer rule, selects an efficient queue and transfers to each agent a 
half of his unit waiting cost from each of his predecessors minus a 
half of the unit waiting cost of each of his followers. 
In this paper, we apply another well-known solution for 
cooperative games, the nucleolus (Schmeidler 1969) to the game, and 
identify the resulting rule. Surprisingly, we obtain the same rule: the 
Shapley value and the nucleolus coincide for queueing problems. We 
also investigate the relation between the minimal transfer rule and 
other rules discussed in the literature, the serial cost sharing rule, 
the core, the τ -value, and the Dutta-Ray solution. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section II contains some 
preliminaries and introduces the minimal transfer rule. Section III 
discusses how to solve a queueing problem by applying solutions of 
cooperative games. Section IV establishes our main result that the 
minimal transfer rule coincides with the nucleolus. Section V 
investigates the relations between the minimal transfer rule and 
other rules, and discusses whether the result can be generalized to a 
broader class of problems. Concluding remarks are in Section VI. 
   COINCIDENCE OF THE SHAPLEY VALUE AND THE NUCLEOLUS 225
II. Preliminaries 
Let N≡{1, 2,…, n} be the set of agents. Each agent needs the same 
amount of time to be served. Agent i∈N is characterized by his unit 
waiting cost, θ i≥0, and is assigned a position σ i∈  in a queue and 
a positive or negative transfer ti∈ . The agent who is served first 
incurs no waiting cost. If agent i∈N is served in the σ ith position, his 
waiting cost is (σ i－1)θ i. Each agent i∈N has a quasi-linear utility 
function: his utility from the assignment (σ i, ti) is given by u(σ i, ti; θ i)
＝ti－(σ i－1)θ i.
A queueing problem is defined as a list q＝(N, θ ) where N is the set 
of agents and θ∈ ＋
N
 is the vector of unit waiting costs. Let QN be the 
class of all problems for N. An allocation for q∈Q is a pair z＝
(σ , t), where for each i∈N, σ i denotes agent i’s position in the queue 
and ti the monetary transfer to him. An allocation is feasible if no 
two agents are assigned the same position and the sum of transfers 
is not positive. Thus, the set of feasible allocations Z (q ) consists of 
all pairs z＝(σ , t) such that for all i, j∈N, i≠j implies σ i≠σ j and 
∑i∈N ti≤0.
Given q＝(N, θ)∈QN, an allocation z＝(σ , t)∈Z (q ) is queue-efficient 
if it minimizes the total waiting costs, that is, for all z’＝(σ ’, t’)∈Z (q ), 
∑i∈N(σ i－1)θ i≤∑i∈N(σ i’－1)θ i. The efficient queue of a problem does 
not depend on the transfers. Moreover, it is unique except for agents 
with equal waiting costs. These agents have to be served consecutively 
but in any order. The set of efficient queues for q∈QN is denoted  
E f f (q ). An allocation z＝(σ , t)∈Z (q ) is budget balanced if ∑i∈N ti＝0. 
An allocation rule, or simply a rule, is a mapping ϕ : QN→ Z (q ), 
which associates with every problem q∈QN a non-empty subset ϕ (q ) 
of feasible allocations. The pair ϕ i(q )＝(σ i, ti) represents i’s position in 
the queue and his transfer in q. Given q＝(N, θ)∈QN, z＝(σ , t)∈Z (q ), 
and i∈N, let Pi(σ ) be the set of agents preceding agent i and Fi(σ ) the 
set of agents following him. 
Now we introduce an important rule. The minimal transfer rule 
(Maniquet 2003) selects an efficient queue and transfers to each 
agent a half of his unit waiting cost from each of his predecessors 
minus a half of the unit waiting cost of each of his followers. 
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Minimal transfer rule, ϕ M: For each q∈QN, 








III. Queueing Games 
We analyze queueing problems by applying solutions of cooperative 
games (games, for short). First, we formally describe how queueing 
problems are mapped into games. Let N≡{1, 2,…, n} be the set of 
players. A set S⊆N is a coalition. A game is a real-valued function v 
defined on all coalitions S⊆N satisfying v(∅)＝0. The number v(S) is 
the worth of S. Let Γ N be the class of games with player set N. A 
solution is a function φ: Γ N→ N, which associates with every game 
v∈ Γ N a vector φ(v)＝(φi(v))i∈N∈ N. The number φi(v) represents the 
payoff to player i in game v. 
Now we introduce two well-known solutions for games, the Shapley 
value and the nucleolus. The Shapley value assigns to each player a 
payoff equal to a weighted average of his marginal contributions to 
all possible coalitions, with weights being determined by the sizes of 
coalitions. The nucleolus chooses an allocation which minimizes the 
difference between the worth of a coalition and its payoff (in the 
lexicographic way). 





For each v∈Γ N, let I(v) be the set of imputations x∈ N such that 
∑i∈N xi＝v(N) and for each i∈N, xi≥v({i }). For each x∈I(v), its excess 
vector e(v, x)∈ 2
N
 is defined by setting for each S⊆N, eS(v, x)≡v(S)
－∑i∈S xi. Its S-coordinate eS(v, x) measures the amount by which the 




 be obtained by rearranging the coordinates of y in non- 
increasing order. For each pair y, z∈ 2
N
, y is lexicographically 
smaller than z if either (i) y͂1＜ z͂1 or (ii) there exists l＞1 such that 
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y͂l＜z͂l. and for all k＜l, y͂k＝z͂k. 
Nucleolus, Nu: For each v∈Γ N such that I(v)≠∅, 
Nu(v)≡{x∈I(v) for each x ’∈I(v)\{x}, e(v, x) is lexicographically smaller than e(v, x ’) }
For each v∈Γ N, the core is the set of imputations at which no 
excess is greater than zero, that is, Core(v)≡{x∈I(v)|for each S⊂N, 
∑i∈S xi≥v(S)}. A game is convex if for each S, T⊆N, v(S)＋v(T)≤v(S∪T)
＋v(S∩T). It is well-known that a convex game has a non-empty core. 
Moreover, the Shapley value and the nucleolus select allocations in 
the core. 
Maniquet (2003) defines the worth of each coalition S⊆N as the 
minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the 
assumption that they are served before the non-coalitional members. 
That is, for each S⊆N, its worth vq(S) is defined by setting: 
   vq(S)＝－ ∑ (σ i*－1)θ i,
i∈S
where σ *∈Eff (S, θS) and θS＝(θ i)i∈S. By applying the Shapley value to 
the game vq＝(vq(S))S⊆N, he shows that the resulting payoff to each 
player is the utility assigned to him by the minimal transfer rule. 
Since the game vq is concave (that is, －vq is convex), I(vq) may be 
empty. Here, we define the worth of a coalition to be the negative of 
Maniquet’s, that is, for each S⊆N, vc(S)≡－vq(S). We call the game vc 
a queueing cost game, and for each S⊆N, vc(S) is the cost of S. 
Obviously, vc is a game in Γ N. Moreover, vc is convex and its 
nucleolus is well-defined. If a game theoretic solution is applied, then 
the resulting payoff to each player is the cost contribution assigned 
to him. It is obvious that it is the negative of the utility assigned to 
him by the solution. 
As shown in Maniquet (2003), the payoff obtained by applying the 
Shapley value to the game vq is the utility assigned by the minimal 
transfer rule to the corresponding queueing problem. 
Theorem M. For each q∈QN and each i∈N, ϕ iM(q )＝Shi(vq)＝－Shi(vc).
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IV. Coincidence of the Shapley Value and the Nucleolus 
Before we apply another well-known solution for games, the 
nucleolus, to queueing cost games and investigate what 
recommendation it makes, we show that the cost of a coalition with 
more than two members can be expressed as a sum of costs of 
two-person coalitions. 
Lemma 1. For each q∈QN, its queueing cost game vc satisfies 
(i) for each i∈N, vc({ i })＝0; 
(ii) for each S⊆N with |S|≥2, vc(S)＝ ∑ vc(T) and vc(S)≥0.
T⊆S
|T|＝2
Since Lemma 1 can easily be proven from the facts that 
(i) for each i∈N, vc({ i } )＝0 and 
(ii) for each pair i, j∈N, vc({i, j})＝min{θ i, θ j}, 
the detailed proofs are omitted. Instead, we present an example 
showing how the worth of a coalition is calculated. 
Example 1: Let N≡{1, 2, 3, 4} and θ∈ ＋N with θ1≥θ2≥θ3≥θ4. Then,
      vc({1, 2, 3})＝θ2＋2θ3＝vc({1, 2})＋vc({1, 3})＋vc({2, 3}), 
      vc({1, 2, 4})＝θ2＋2θ4＝vc({1, 2})＋vc({1, 4})＋vc({2, 4}), 
      vc({1, 3, 4})＝θ3＋2θ4＝vc({1, 3})＋vc({1, 4})＋vc({3, 4}), 
      vc({2, 3, 4})＝θ3＋2θ4＝vc({2, 3})＋vc({2, 4})＋vc({3, 4}), 
   vc({1, 2, 3, 4})＝θ2＋2θ3＋3θ4 
                 ＝ vc({1, 2})＋vc({1, 3})＋vc({1, 4}) 
                   ＋vc({2, 3})＋vc({2, 4})＋vc({3, 4}). 
Let Γ ͂N be the class of games satisfying the two conditions of 
Lemma 1. That is, v∈Γ ͂N if and only if for each i∈N, v({i})＝0, and for 
each S⊆N with |S|≥2, v(S)＝ΣT⊆S,|T|＝2 v(T). This class includes, in 
particular, our queueing cost games, and more. Therefore, as shown 
in Deng and Papadimitriou (1994) and van den Nouweland et al. 
(1996), the coincidence between the Shapley value and the nucleolus 
can be established. 
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For completeness, we present an alternative proof using the 
Kohlberg’s (1971) lemma. First, the following lemma can be easily 
proven from our previous observations. 
Lemma 2. For each v∈Γ N͂ and each i∈N, Shi(v)＝
1 ∑ v(S).
2 S⊆N,S∋i,|S|＝2
The Shapley value of the queueing cost game can be calculated by 
using only the worths of the two-person coalitions: It assigns to each 
agent a half of the sum of his contributions on all two person 
coalitions. We note that its computational burden is significantly 
reduced since we need to know n(n－1)/2 numbers instead of 2
n－1 
numbers. 
Now we show that at the Shapley value allocation, the excess of a 
coalition equals to the excess of its complementary coalition. 






then, for each S⊆N, 
v(S)－ ∑ xi ＝ v(N\S )－ ∑ xi.
i∈S i∈N\S
Proof: Let v∈Γ N͂ and S⊂N. If 1＜|S|＜|N|, then 
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If S＝N\{ j}, then 











2 {i, j}⊆N 
i∈S
                        ＝v({ j})－xj, 
the desired conclusion.                                            ■
For each v : 2
N→ , each x∈ N with ∑i∈N xi＝v(N), and each α∈ , 
let 
Sα (v, x)≡{S∈2N|S≠∅ and v(S)－∑xi≥α }.
                                             i∈S
A collection B⊆2N of coalitions is strictly balanced on N if there 
exists a list (δS)S∈B of positive weights such that for each i∈N, 
∑δS＝1.                            
S∈B
                             S∋i
Lemma 4. (Kohlberg 1971) For each v∈Γ and each x∈I(v), 
x＝Nu(v)⇔
for each α∈  with Sα (v, x)≠∅,
there exists S⊆{{i }|i∈N and v({i})－xi＝0}
such that Sα (v, x)∪S is strictly balanced on N.
We are ready to state and prove our main result. 
Theorem 1. For each v∈Γ ͂N, 
Sh(v)＝Nu(v). 
Proof: By Lemma 2, for each v∈Γ ͂N and each i∈N, 






Let α∈  be such that Sα (v, Sh(v))≠∅. Let S∈Sα (v, Sh(v)). Since by 
Lemma 3, 
v(N\S)－ ∑ Shi(v)＝v(S)－ ∑ Shi(v),
                        i∈N\S                      i∈S
N\S∈Sα (v, Sh(v)). Thus, Sα (v, Sh(v)) is strictly balanced on N. The 
desired conclusion follows from Lemma 4.                         ■
V. Discussion 
In this section, we further investigate the relations between the 
minimal transfer rule and other rules proposed in the literature. 
Also, we discuss whether our results can be extended to a broader 
class of problems. 
A. The Serial Cost Sharing Rule 
As shown in Moulin (2004), the minimal transfer rule coincides 
with the serial cost sharing rule for scheduling problems. The same 
observation can be made for queueing problems. In fact, its proof 
can be easily obtained by checking our simple formula for the 
Shapley value given in Lemma 2. To further simplify the argument, 
let (N, θ)∈QN be such that θ1≥θ2≥…≥θn. From Lemma 2, Shn(vc)＝
{(n－1)/2}θn, Shn－1(vc)＝{(n－2)/2}θn－1＋(1/2)θn, and so on. 
To calculate the payoff assigned by the serial cost sharing rule, we 
need to assume that all agents have θn. Then, the total cost 
{1＋…＋(n－1)}θn is divided equally among all agents, and in 
particular agent n receives {(n－1)/2}θn. Now suppose that agent n 
leaves and the remaining agent have the unit waiting cost θn－1. 
Then, the total cost goes up by {1＋…＋(n－2)}(θn－1－θn), and this 
increase is shared equally among the remaining (n－1) agents, and in 
particular agent n－1 receives (n－2)/2(θn－1－θn). Since he was 
originally assigned {(n－1)/2}θn, his final assignment is {(n－2)/2}θn－1
＋(1/2)θn. And so on. It is easy to check that this is exactly the 
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amount assigned by the simple formula of the Shapley value. In our 
queueing cost problem, the serial cost sharing and the minimal 
transfer rule make the same recommendation. 
B. The Core 
For a convex game, both the Shapley value and the nucleolus 
select an allocation in the core. It is natural to ask about the 
structure of the core for queueing cost games. In particular, one 
might conjecture that the coincidence between the two solutions 
comes from the fact that the core is a singleton. However, as shown 
in Figure 1 for a 3-agent problem with N≡{1, 2, 3} and θ1≥θ2≥θ3, 
this is not the case. Its core is pretty large. However, it has a rather 
symmetric structure. This is the central reason why the two 
solutions coincide. 
C. The τ-value 
For each v∈ΓN and each i∈N, let Mi(v)≡v(N)－v(N\{i}) and 
mi(v)≡v({i }). Then, the τ-value (Tijs 1987) selects the maximal feasible 
allocation on the line connecting M(v)≡(Mi(v))i∈N and m(v)≡(mi(v))i∈N.
τ -value, τ : For each convex game v, 
τ (v)≡λM(v)＋(1－λ )m(v), 
where λ∈[0, 1] is chosen so as to satisfy 
∑ [λ (v(N)－v(N\{ j }))＋(1－λ )v({ j })]＝v(N).
             
j∈N
For a queueing cost game v, m(v)＝0. Moreover, it is easy to see 
that for each j∈N, v(N)－v(N\{ j })＝∑S∋j,|S|＝2 v(S) and that λ＝1/2. 
Thus, the τ -value coincides with the Shapley value, and therefore, 
the nucleolus for queueing problems. 
D. The Dutta-Ray Solution 
Next we investigate the Dutta-Ray solution (Dutta and Ray 1989). 
In general, this solution selects a core allocation which maximizes 
the Lorenz ordering. Since our games are convex, the solution can be 
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Note: The core of a queueing cost game may not be completely symmetric, 
but it is sufficiently symmetric to guarantee Sh(vc)＝Nu(vc). In the 
figure, the core of a three-agent queueing cost game is the interior 
(and the boundary) of ABCDEF, and it is symmetric with respect to 
lines l and m.
FIGURE 1
THE CORE OF A QUEUEING COST GAME
defined as follows.
Dutta-Ray solution, DR: For each convex game v for N, DR(v)∈
N is 
the payoff vector derived by the following algorithm: 
Step 1. Let N1≡N and v1≡v. Find the unique coalition S1∈2
N1\{∅} 
such that for each S∈2N1\{0, S1}, (i) v1(S1)/|S1|≥v1(S)/|S| and 
(ii) if v1(S1)/|S1|＝v1(S)/|S|, then |S1|＞|S|.1 For each i∈S1, let 
DRi(v)≡v1(S1)/|S1|. If S1≠N1, proceed to the next step.  
Step k. Suppose that Nk－1∈2
N\{∅}, vk－1∈ΓNk－1 with vk－1(∅)＝0, and 
Sk－1∈ 2
Nk－1\ {∅, Nk－1} have been defined. Let Nk≡Nk－1\Sk－1 and 
1
The uniqueness of S1 is guaranteed by the convexity of v1.
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vk∈ ΓNk be defined by setting for each S∈2Nk, 
vk(S)≡vk－1(S∪Sk－1)－vk－1(Sk－1). 
Find the unique coalition Sk∈2
Nk\{∅} such that for each 
S∈2
Nk－1\{∅, Sk}, (i) vk(Sk)/|Sk|≥vk(S)/|S| and (ii) if vk(Sk)/|Sk|＝
vk(S)/|S|, then |Sk|＞|S|.2 For each i∈Sk, let DRi(v)≡vk(Sk)/|Sk|. 
If Sk≠Nk, proceed to the next step. 
When applied to queueing cost games, the Dutta-Ray solution 
selects an allocation in the core, different from the Shapley value 
allocation. 
Example 2: Let N≡{1, 2, 3}, θ≡(6, 5, 1), and q≡(N, θ). Then 
vc({1, 2})＝5, vc({1, 3})＝1, vc({2, 3})＝1, and vc({1, 2, 3})＝7. Thus, 
Sh(vc)＝(3, 3, 1) and DR(vc)＝(5/2, 5/2, 2).                         □
E. The Maximal Transfer Rule 
The maximal transfer rule (Chun 2006a, b) selects an efficient 
queue and transfers to each agent a half of the unit waiting cost of 
each of his predecessors minus a half of his waiting cost to each of 
his followers. 
Maximal transfer rule, ϕX: For all q∈QN,
ϕ X(q )＝{(σX, tX)∈ Z (q )|σX∈E f f (q ), and ∀i∈N, 








As shown in Chun (2006a), if the worth of a coalition is defined as 
the minimum total waiting cost incurred by its members under the 
assumption that they are served after the non-coalitional members, 
this rule assigns the same utility as the Shapley value of the 
corresponding game. Moreover, the coincidence between the Shapley 
value and the nucleolus can be obtained for this class of games. 
Although these games do not satisfy two conditions of Lemma 2, 
2 If v is convex, then vk is convex. Again, the uniqueness of Sk is 
guaranteed by the convexity of vk.
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their zero-normalized versions obtained by defining for each S⊆N, 
v ̅(S)＝v(S)－∑i∈S v({i}), satisfy them. The proof can be completed by 
using the fact that both the Shapley value and the nucleolus satisfy 
zero-independence, requiring that adding a constant to the worth of 
coalitions containing i should affect his payoff by the constant. 
Also, it can be shown that the maximal transfer rule coincides 
with the decreasing serial cost sharing rule (de Frutos 1998) for 
queueing and scheduling problems. 
F. Sequencing Problems 
A sequencing problem (Suijs 1996)3 is a list (N, r, θ), where N is 
the set of agents, r≡(ri)i∈N is the vector representing the service time 
required by agents, and θ≡(θ i)i∈N is the vector of unit waiting costs. 
A queueing problem is obtained by setting for each i∈N, ri＝1, and a 
scheduling problem by setting for each i∈N, θ i＝1. It is interesting to 
note that if a sequencing problem is transformed to a cost game, 
then it satisfies two conditions identified in Lemma 2. Therefore, the 
game belongs to Γ ͂N, and therefore, our coincidence result still holds. 
VI. Concluding Remarks 
In this paper, we show that the Shapley value and the nucleolus 
coincide on the domain of queueing cost games (also, sequencing 
cost games). However, our conditions are sufficient, but not 
necessary. It would be interesting to find a necessary condition to 
guarantee the coincidence of these two solutions. We leave this as 
our next research agenda. 
(Received 9 October 2006; Revised 27 February 2007)
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